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Socrattes Ofori-Addo v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWCA Civ 277

Lady Justice Nicola Davies

Lord Justice Stuart-Smith

Mr Justice Cobb

Tuesday 18 March 2025

Appeal dismissed.

The Court of Appeal upheld HHJ Saggerson’s decision on a section 204 appeal in the County Court that where an applicant requests a review on suitability under Part VII of the 1996 Act, the review officer is not obliged to anticipate and consider what further duty (if any) may be owed to the applicant without a request for a review on that basis.

Facts

The Appellant (“A”) is a single mother to two disabled sons. In May 2019, the Respondent (“R”) found that due to the children’s disabilities and housing needs, the family required a three-bedroom house. In July 2021, R accepted it owed a relief duty under section 189B of the Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) and that A was entitled to a three-bedroom house.

A was subsequently placed in temporary accommodation by R and on 13 September 2021, R offered an assured shorthold tenancy of a three-bedroom property to A for a fixed term of 24 months. The offer letter stated that the offer was a final accomodation offer under section 193A(4) of the 1996 Act.

A, via solicitors, rejected the offer on 22 September 2021 on the basis that it was not suitable and asked for a review of the decision. A’s letter stated that where a review concerned the suitability of a final accommodation offer, the interim duty continued until the review was concluded.

On 24 September 2021, R wrote to A saying that its relief duty had ended and the main housing duty did not apply. The letter offered a review of that decision however A never sought a review of that particular decision. A’s solicitors then sent a number of letters to R on the issue of suitability.

On 20 January 2022, R sent its review decision to A which concluded that the accommodation was suitable on all grounds. In response, A requested that accommodation be provided pending an appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act. This was refused by R the following day with R explaining that A could seek judicial review of that decision. A was subsequently evicted from the temporary accommodation on 17 February 2022 and did not bring judicial review proceedings.

A brought a section 204 appeal on the review decision however on the day of the appeal hearing, R withdrew its challenged review decision and agreed to undertake a fresh review within 56 days therefore the appeal was dismissed.

On 26 May 2023, R sent a letter to A stating that it was minded to uphold the decision on 24 September 2021 that the relief duty had come to an end as A had refused a final offer of accommodation. A made further submissions in response on the issue of suitability however R’s review decision of 07 June 2023 found that the accommodation was suitable and again stated that the relief duty had come to an end.

A therefore brought another appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act asking the court to quash the review decision of 07 June 2023 or to vary it to a decision that the relief duty had not come to an end and A did not refuse an offer of suitable accommodation. The second ground of appeal was that the review decision was deficient in failing to go on to consider what duty, if any, R owed to A as a person with priority need notwithstanding the finding of suitability.

HHJ Saggerson heard the section 204 appeal and summarised the ground of appeal as being that having concluded that the relief duty had ended and the main housing duty no longer applied, the review officer should have asked themselves whether R owed any other duty under Part VII of the 1996 Act but failed to do so.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety but on this ground of appeal, HHJ Saggerson held that A had only ever asked for a review of the decision on suitability and it was not incumbent on a review officer to “embark on a comprehensive overhaul or rethink of the entire process in respect of matters that he has not been asked to review or reconsider.” As suitability was the only issue engaged, R only had to consider suitability and the review officer adequately covered all “necessary ground”. Further, a review officer was not required to anticipate and deal with any potential issue under the 1996 Act which may arise.

A appealed to the Court of Appeal on the following grounds:

• Ground 1 – R erred in concluding that as a result of sections 193A(2) and (3) of the 1996 Act, no further duty was owed to A under Part VII of the 1996 Act following R ending the relief duty.

• Ground 2 – HHJ Saggerson erred in rejecting the argument that the local authority must take into account events surrounding the decision and subsequent to the decision, in considering what other duties may be owed under Part VII of the 1996 Act.

Note of Judgment

A’s primary submissions on Ground 1 were that in the review decision, R failed to make a decision under section 184 of the 1996 Act as to what, if any, duties it owed to A under Part VII if the 1996 Act or, if no duties were owed, R failed to give written reasons for that decision. A contended that had R considered what other duties it might owe A, it woud have concluded that it owed A a duty under section 190(2) of the 1996 Act as a person who was intentionally homeless but had a priority need and in respect of whom the relief duty had come to an end.

R conceded that the end of the relief and main housing duties under section 193A(1) of the 1996 Act did not automatically mean the end of a homelessness application and that there may still be an obligation on a local housing authority to make a decision pursuant to section 184 of the 1996 Act as whether any other duties are owed. However, R submitted that the appeal was misconceived as A had only ever requested a review of R’s decision on suitability under section 202(1)(h) of the 1996 Act and there was no obligation on R to go further than the review that was requested.

R further submitted that it had made a decision under section 184 of the 1996 Act by its letter dated 24 September 2021 which informed A that R owed no further duty to help her or provide her with accommodation, and A had never sought a review of that decision. In addition, A had never sought a review of the decisions in subsequent letters that no further duties were owed therefore there was no obligation on R to carry out a review of eligibility or scope of duty and there was no recourse to the County Court on this point. If there was no decision by R on eligibility or scope of duty, A’s recourse was by way of judicial review not sections 202 and 204 of the 1996 Act.

At paragraphs 60 to 65 of the judgment, Stuart-Smith LJ held that R had made clear before and after the rejection of the final accommodation offer that refusal of the offer meant its relief duty had come to an end and the main housing duty would not apply. A’s submission that there was no decision on scope of duty or under section 184 of the 1996 Act was therefore a “difficult interpretation to sustain” as R’s letters were clear and peremptory. Even if A’s submission was correct, she should have sought judicial review.

Further, A had never requested a review of the decision of eligibility or scope of duty and by virtue of the different provisions of section 202(1) of the 1996 Act, the request for a review on suitability did not amount to a request for R to review every aspect of its relationship with A. As such, it was held that HHJ Saggerson was correct in his judgment and the Court of Appeal agreed that a review officer is not required to deal in an anticipatory manner with “things that may or may not happen in the context of obligations and considerations that are not engaged on a particular review.”

Ground 1 was accordingly unanimously rejected by the Court of Appeal and Ground 2 was rejected for the same reasons. It is of note that Temur v Hackney LBC [2014] EWCA Civ 877 was distinguished and Lewison LJ’s judgment was held to mean that a local housing authority should only reconsider what duty it owes a homelessness applicant if it is the specified subject of the request for a review.